Hamas prime minister, Ismail Haniya, though Hamas maintains that this decision was unconstitutional and still considers Haniya to be the legitimate head of government. Whatever the legality of the situation, by this time the governance structures of the Basic Law had all but broken down.
It is very difficult to determine to what extent semi-presidentialism is responsible for the problems of governance in the Palestinian Authority, but the importance of institutions in shaping the behaviour of political actors in the Palestinian context is often neglected in favour of other factors, which appear at first to be more relevant. Obviously, the internal and external problems faced by the Palestinian Authority are greater than those faced by almost any other jurisdiction in the world and it would be naive to suggest that semipresidentialism per se was anything other than a contributory factor to the problems faced by the Authority since January 2006. In some ways, the stage for a conflict between Fatah, reluctant to relinquish its role as the sole voice of the Palestinians, and Hamas, the new representative of Palestinian nationalism, was already set, but semi-presidential arrangements might have contributed to its timing and acceleration. As Kirschke has demonstrated in the case of sub-Saharan African countries, institutionalized conflict between the president and the legislature can sometimes tip fragile regimes over the democratic edge. 4 Was this the case in the Palestinian Authority? To what extent are the conventional arguments against semi-presidentialism supported by recent events in the Palestinian Authority? These are the questions this article aims to answer.
These questions are important not merely as they relate to the Palestinian Authority or indeed as they relate to the study of semi-presidentialism generally.
They are also important in the context of the growing literature analyzing the influence of institutions on political systems in the Arab world. For a long time, the study of the formal institutions in this region was neglected because it was believed that power was exercised largely through informal processes and channels. While this might have been true in the past, the democratizing and liberalising reforms of the 1980s and 1990s introduced a degree of political institutionalization that political actors had to contend with. Thus, while elections in most Arab countries still do not produce political change, it is important to analyse them because they reveal societal trends and offer insights into how political actors react to them. 5 A similar argument can be made for analysing apparently powerless legislatures. An analysis of the effects of semipresidentialism on the choices of Palestinian political actors contributes to our understanding of the ways in which institutions matter in the Arab world.
To begin, the standard arguments against semi-presidentialism are identified. Next, the constitutional structure of the amended Palestinian Basic Law is briefly outlined. Then, events during the period of cohabitation following the 2006 elections are analyzed to determine whether or not the problems of governance in the Palestinian Authority were associated with the textbook shortcomings of semi-presidentialism.
For the purposes of this article semi-presidentialism is defined as the situation where a country's constitution provides for both a directly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet that are collectively responsible to the legislature. This definition is slightly different from Duverger's original presentation of the concept. 6 However, it is now a common way of defining this constitutional form. 7 On the basis of this definition, there are now nearly 60 countries with semi-presidential constitutions. This set of countries is very heterogeneous, including established West European examples such as Finland and France, as well as newer examples across the world, including Armenia, Haiti, Mongolia, Poland, Senegal and Taiwan. To make sense of the variety within the class of semi-presidential countries, there is a now standard distinction between two forms of semi-presidentialism. Based on the original work of Shugart and Carey, there are countries with a premier-presidential form of semi-presidentialism, which is where the prime minister is responsible solely to the legislature, while there are other countries with a president-parliamentary form, which is where the prime minister is responsible both to the legislature and to the president. 8 Premier-presidential countries include France, Lithuania, Mali and Timor-Leste. President-parliamentary countries include the Central African Republic, Georgia, Russia and, in the past, Weimar Germany. As we shall see, the Palestinian Authority has a president-parliamentary form of semipresidentialism.
There are many reasons why semi-presidentialism may be a tempting constitutional choice. For example, when there is a weak executive, the introduction of a directly elected president can provide the promise of charismatic leadership. By contrast, if an already powerful president faces social unrest, then creating the post of prime minister and offering it to the opposition can be a way for the president to calm the situation while still remaining in power. That said, however politically expedient the adoption of semipresidentialism might often be, there is an overwhelming academic consensus against the introduction of this form of government. 9 Moreover, within the set of semi-presidential countries, several observers have identified presidentparliamentarism as a more problematic form of semi-presidentialism than premier-presidentialism. 10 The critics of semi-presidentialism point to the problems supposedly inherent in the institutional structure of semipresidentialism and suggest that these problems make governance more difficult generally and that in the case of nascent democracies they risk causing the collapse of the fledgling democratic system. If the academic wisdom is correct, therefore, then not only has the Palestinian Authority chosen a potentially damaging type of constitutional arrangement, it has also chosen the most dangerous sub-type of this form of government.
There are various reasons why semi-presidentialism in general and president-parliamentarism in particular are considered to be problematic for new and fragile democracies. For example, Lijphart has warned against the excessive presidentialisation of power that can occur under semi-presidentialism. He argues that when the president is supported by a disciplined legislative majority semi-presidential systems "actually make it possible for the president to be even more powerful than in most pure presidential systems." 11 Usually, though, the critics of semi-presidentialism focus on the problems caused by the situation where the president does not enjoy the support of a disciplined legislative majority. Given this situation is the one that is potentially relevant to the case of the Palestinian Authority, we outline the two main variations of these problems both in relation to semi-presidentialism as a whole and to its presidentparliamentary form specifically.
The first variation focuses on the potential for problems within the dual executive. In semi-presidential countries, the prime minister is responsible to the legislature. Therefore, to be appointed and to remain in office, the prime minister must have at least the tacit support of the legislature. When the president's party fails to enjoy a legislative majority, then it may be the case that the president has to appoint a prime minister from a different party. In this event, the prime minister may be from a coalition that includes the president's majority, or from a party or coalition that is opposed to the president. The first scenario -where the president and prime minister are from opposing parties but where the president's party is represented in government -is called a 'divided executive'.
The second scenario -where the president and prime minister are from opposing parties and where the president's party is not represented in government -is a particular example of a divided executive called 'cohabitation'.
The critics of semi-presidentialism have focused on the potential for intraexecutive conflict during periods when there is a divided executive and/or cohabitation. While semi-presidentialism seems to offer the potential for opposing actors to share at least some executive power, the critics of semipresidentialism suggest that such actors are unlikely to be satisfied with only limited executive authority and that the president and prime minister will try to compete for power. In the case of fragile democracies, such competition at the heart of the executive may be destabilizing. For example, Stepan and Suleiman, worry that the president may be tempted to use decree powers and subvert the rule of law, particularly if the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and has the support of the military. So, they argue that the "main theoretical and political worry about semi-presidentialism, of course, is precisely the question of deadlock and constitutional conflict between the dual executive.
A deadlock can become particularly dangerous if the president has special authority over the security forces and some emergency powers" (Stepan and Suleiman, 1995: 399). 12 For his part, Fabbrini also worries that the competition between the president and prime minister may lead to gridlock. He states:
"When the president is the leader of the party that controls the National Assembly, the executive gaze rests on him. When a different party controls the Assembly, the executive gaze focuses on the premier, with some conditions imposed by the president. Herein lies the main weakness of semipresidentialism: the possibility of a rift between the president with his popular majority and the premier with his legislative majority. Such a split could hamper of even paralyze the executive." 13 The second variation of the problems associated with semipresidentialism focuses on the relationship between the executive and the legislature. Here, there is a potential problem of dual legitimacy. When the president does not enjoy the support of a disciplined legislative majority and the legislature refuses to support the president's programme, the president may feel that his/her popular mandate is being undermined. By the same token, though, if the president refuses to cooperate with the legislature and/or tries to bypass it, the legislature may feel that its mandate is being undermined. In a consolidated democracy the resulting gridlock may lead to the inability to pass basic legislation such as the annual budget. This can lead to serious problems of governance. In a fragile democracy the problem of dual legitimacy may be more serious still. Here, it is likely to lead either to a breakdown in the rule of law as the president rules by decree or to a stalemate between the president and legislature that encourages the military to intervene to break the deadlock. In their work, Linz and Stepan are explicit about the dangers for young democracies of this sort of dual legitimacy: "When supporters of one or the other component of semi-presidentialism feel that the country would be better off if one branch of the democratically legitimated structure of rule would disappear or be closed, the democratic system is endangered and suffers an overall loss of legitimacy, since those questioning one or the other will tend to consider the political system undesirable as long as the side they favor does not prevail … [I]n a semipresidential system, policy conflicts often express themselves as a conflict between two branches of democracy." 14 In addition to these general criticisms of semi-presidentialism, there are specific criticisms of the president-parliamentary form of semi-presidentialism.
Under semi-presidentialism generally, the president must work through the prime minister and the legislature. As most French presidents would be able to confirm, when the president is the de facto leader of the legislative majority and the prime minister is subordinate to the president, then the president can be assured that his/her programme will be safely implemented. However, as we have seen, when the president fails to enjoy a supportive majority, there can be problems. In this event, there is a key difference between premierpresidentialism and president-parliamentarism. Under the former, the president cannot dismiss the prime minister. As a result, while all the problems of a divided executive may occur under premier-presidentialism, the president may decide simply to let the prime minister govern, knowing that s/he has no option but to put up with the person who has been approved by the legislature. Under president-parliamentarism, though, the president always retains the option of dismissing the prime minister as a way of trying to break the stalemate. Given the appointment of a replacement still requires the support of the legislature, the president may simply find that the relationship with the new prime minister is just as problematic, if not more so because of the crisis caused by the dismissal of his/her predecessor. In short, under president-parliamentarism the president's ability to dismiss the prime minister can exacerbate the problems of a divided executive and dual legitimacy that are found generally under semipresidentialism.
In rest of this article, we examine whether the problems of semi- This case also provides a particularly difficult test for the critics of semipresidentialism. In the period under consideration the Palestinian Authority faced extremely challenging economic and social conditions and a chronic security crisis. These problems would probably have been enough to lead to a decline in the quality of governance almost anywhere. However, in the face of these problems, if we find evidence that semi-presidentialism had an independent negative effect on the governance situation in the Palestinian Authority, then the critics of semi-presidentialism can reasonably claim that their arguments hold water. To identify such an effect, we need to look for evidence that the actors themselves, and expert commentators, considered the constitutional arrangement to be a source of at least some of the problems with which the Authority was faced. Given the many other problems faced by these actors, if they single out the constitution as an additional source of problems, then we can conclude that semi-presidentialism had an effect. Before we look for such evidence, we briefly sketch the constitutional framework of the Basic Law.
The Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority
The Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority is the equivalent of an interim constitution that is meant to be in force until a fully sovereignty independent state is achieved and a permanent constitution is adopted. Work on the document began in 1993 and four years later the Legislative Council approved the agreed draft. However, President Arafat did not ratify the Basic Law until 2002. Nonetheless, at that point the Palestinian Authority can be considered to have become a constitutional regime. 16 In 2002, the Basic Law established a presidential system. There was a directly elected president (Art. 51). There was also provision for a Council of Ministers, which was chaired by the president (Art. 62). However, there was no prime minister. The president had the power to remove ministers (Art. 62) and it was explicitly stated that ministers were responsible to the president (Art. 68).
The Council of Ministers did require an investiture vote (Art. 64), and the president had the right to request a vote of confidence in the Council of Ministers by the Legislative Council (Art. 71). In addition, at the request of at least ten of its The president has the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister (Art. 45).
Indeed, it is stated explicitly that the prime minister is accountable to the president and to the Legislative Council (Art. 74). The prime minister chairs the Council of Ministers (Art. 68). As before, the government has to pass an investiture vote (Art. 66) and the Legislative Council can pass a motion of noconfidence in the government (Art. 57 and Art. 78). In these ways, the 2003 version of the Basic Law clearly established a semi-presidential regime.
Moreover, given the prime minister was responsible to both the president and the legislature, it established a president-parliamentary form of semipresidentialism.
In 2005 there was a further amendment to the Basic Law. This amendment was, in itself, very important, but it did not alter the semi-presidential nature of the constitution or its president-parliamentary form. The amendment specified that both the president and Legislative Council served for a four-year term of office. It also specified that the president was limited to two consecutive terms. It should be noted that the amendments did not specify that presidential and legislative elections were concurrent. In fact, they were not synchronised and, indeed, the absence of concurrent elections was the reason for the constitutional crisis that began in January 2006. In the next section, we examine whether semipresidentialism had an effect on the quality of governance in the Palestinian Authority from 2006-2007. We begin by arguing that conflict between Hamas and Fatah was not inevitable. We then suggests reasons why semi-presidential nature of the Palestinian institutions may have contributed to the increase in conflict between the rival forces.
Semi-presidentialism and the collapse of Palestinian unity
There is very little doubt that the "Hamas's takeover of Gaza and President First of all, the labelling of all political Islamist movements as inherently anti-democratic and violent is highly debatable from a theoretical point of view, as it is impossible to determine a priori and in isolation from the surrounding institutional context how a political movement will behave in a pluralistic and competitive environment. 22 Empirical evidence also supports the view that Islamist movements should be analysed and understood in the specific contexts within which they operate. 23 In the case of Hamas, it should be for instance highlighted that the movement has always had a high regard for procedural democracy. As both Gunning pointed out, throughout its existence Hamas always displayed a significant degree of internal democracy. 24 In addition, Hamas candidates regularly participated in the elections of the representative bodies of the professional organisations, the students' unions and the local councils, although they boycotted the 1996 PLC elections because they were a direct emanation of Oslo.
Secondly, the link between violence and Islamism should also be challenged. It is often assumed that Islamists directly or indirectly support the use of violence to attain political objectives and this is certainly true for avowedly jihadi movements operating both within Palestinian society 25 and in the wider Muslim world. 26 However, Hamas does not fall into this category and its use of violence is much more pragmatic and part of a much broader strategy which includes delivery of social services and electoral politics to achieve the creation of Palestinian state. 27 Before 2007, the use of violence on the part of Hamas was almost solely directed towards Israel and was justified with a discourse of resistance. On the domestic scene Hamas had largely refrained from employing violence and when its militants were involved in sporadic clashes with Fatah, it was usually as a response to Arafat's perceived repressive measures against the movement on the instigation of Israel and the United States. 28 In addition, Hamas leaders always emphasised that once in power they would respect political and social pluralism.
Finally, it should be highlighted that the position of Hamas regarding the peace process with Israel, the most significant bone of contention with Fatah, is neither as unique nor simple as often portrayed. It is not unique because other Palestinian groups, both religious and secular, rejected the Oslo accords by virtue of the fact that they perceived them to be a 'sell-out.' The attitude of Hamas to the peace process is also not simply rejectionist and ideological as some claim. 29 While formally opposed to Oslo, it nevertheless supports peace with the Israelis, although it has a very different conceptualisation of what a just peace involves and what should be done to achieve it. It is obviously an idea of peace that clashes with the one that Israel and the international community have in mind. new elections was never carried out because it emerged that Hamas might in fact be returned to be power despite its inability to implement its manifesto and because the movement itself strongly signalled that calling new elections, although a constitutional prerogative of the President, would amount to "a coup against Palestinian legitimacy and the will of the Palestinian people". The hardliner Hamas leader Siyam stated: "Abbas has the right to dismiss the government but he has no right to give legitimacy to any future government" and added that "there are enough constitutional, legal and popular measures to enable us to confront anything that we regard as harmful to Palestinian national interests, led by our right in the Legislative Council to bring down any government and rob it of any legitimacy". 34 The discussion about the threat of dismissal and the calling of new elections represents a significant example of the impasse that semipresidentialism provoked and illustrates how such an arrangement increased the likelihood of a showdown between the presidency and the cabinet because it provided the opportunity for both actors to use constitutional prerogatives and popular legitimacy to validate their respective positions and demands. Hamas, often accused of being the spoiler of Palestinian politics, found itself in the position of defending the constitutional status of its members of parliament and its cabinet, leading the movement to utilise exclusively political means and legal discourse to carry out its objectives. If the position of the cabinet had been wholly subordinated to presidential powers, the Hamas leadership and Hamas parliamentarians would have been more reluctant to challenge the policy decisions of the President for fear of provoking a split within the nationalist camp. In the event, though, Hamas did not see new elections as a way of recomposing the nationalist camp and giving way to a national unity government, but as an attempt by a discredited and defeated Fatah to take both legitimacy and policy-making power away from the cabinet. Accordingly, the movement not only questioned the political legitimacy of new elections, but refused in December 2006 to consider a national unity government in which they would have to give up key ministries to Fatah. 35 Playing the institutional game taught Hamas that the movement could take the moral high ground and increase its legitimacy among ordinary Palestinians and it is partly for this reason that it was able to very quickly dismantle Fatah power in Gaza and consolidate its rule after June 2007 without losing support in the West Bank. 36 The national unity government agreed in March 2007 between Fatah and Hamas to resolve the previous year's impasse never got off the ground because by then the two competing centres of power had realised that the PA institutions would not be able to accommodate the irreconcilable legitimacy claims and policies of the two actors. When Abbas decided to finally dismiss Haniya, Hamas leaders refused to accept the legitimacy of the decision, making the following descent into chaos and civil war inevitable. The dispute over who has the constitutional right to govern in the PA is not over, but as the Al Ahram weekly commentator aptly put it "any talk about legitimacy is no longer relevant, for all constitutional and legal norms have been discarded." 37 When Abbas issued presidential decrees to appropriate a number of functions and powers that should have been left to the cabinet, he signalled very strongly his intention to marginalise Hamas. However, the popular mandate Hamas received in the 2006 elections encouraged the movement to hold firm against Abbas, leading ministers to dispute the president's decisions and powers.
The quality and coherence of governance inevitably suffered from this deadlock and this is evident for instance in the crucial area of policing and security. According to Hilal and Khan "the initial focus of externally assisted institutional capacity-building in the PNA was in the area of policing, surveillance and the maintenance of internal order. The PNA had to prove its capacity in these areas in order to make progress towards statehood." 38 This led to a proliferation of security services and police forces, which were highly disconnected from one another but which were all connected to the Presidency. Loyalty to Arafat and Fatah was expected and when, therefore, the Hamas cabinet announced that it would exercise its constitutional right to assert its authority in this area through terrorism" 39 domestically. While the seeds of the conflict had therefore been already sown, the institutional arrangements deepened the rift because they forced the two actors to a showdown on the use and direction of the security forces given that the presidency saw them as a rampart against what he perceived to be 'domestic extremism,' while the Hamas cabinet saw them as a resource to be mobilised against Israel. If a clearer separation of powers had been adopted, it could have been more complicated for any of the two actors to establish a security force claiming to be sole representative of the will of the Palestinians. Instead, the creation of two centres of power led to the institutionalisation of polarisation, laying the foundations for the civil conflict.
In an October 2006 interview Siyam's frustration with the institutional arrangements strongly emerged as he believed they impinged on his job as minister of interior in place. When asked to comment on rumours regarding the establishment of a Palestinian quasi-army in the West Bank loyal to Fatah and ready to take on Hamas, he replied that "there are things that are going on behind the scenes and without the knowledge of the interior minister, such as bringing arms inside the Gaza Strip. We as a government and an interior minister know nothing about this." 40 Said Siyam also emphasised more generally that the discord with President Abbas undermined governance because "when we were in the 10th government [the Hamas government that preceded the unity government], the president did not participate with us in any meeting or visit on any level for a whole year. He worked separately from us." 41 While not referring specifically to the issue of security, it emerges quite clearly that the Hamas cabinet felt that institutions within which they were working did not in practice reflect the victory they had won at the polls and the popular mandate they were supposed to be carrying out. With regard to the issue of the control of the security forces, it is interesting to mention that a similar rift occurred when the Minister of Interior was Abbas himself (he was also the Prime Minister) and the president was Arafat, both from Fatah. They clashed often on this issue because they fundamentally disagreed on the type of reforms and future role of the Palestinian security force. Arafat finally won out when Abbas was forced to resign in favour of a Fatah member more loyal to Arafat. This conflict over the control of the security forces did not degenerate into an open conflict as it would with the Hamas cabinet because both Arafat and Abbas belonged to Fatah, indicating that when the president and the prime minister are from the same party semi-presidentialism is not an obstacle to policy coherence and governance, as one of them advances while the other retreats.
The negative consequences of semi-presidentialism are very evident also when one looks at the 'foreign policy' of the Palestinian Authority. When Fatah controlled both the presidency and the cabinet, first Arafat and then Abbas were clearly the only voice of the Palestinians on the international system and, crucially, they were directing the negotiations with Israel through the PLO structures. With the creation of a strong cabinet, the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs became more important, but it is only with the appointment of Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar that it became clear that the institutional arrangements would have an extremely negative effect on how Palestinian foreign affairs were conducted, leading once again to conflicts and precipitating the collapse of Palestinian unity on the international stage. Upon his appointment as foreign minister, Zahar had this to say about the peace process and negotiations with Israel: "Israel wants to negotiate only for the sake of negotiations, but on the ground, it expands settlements and continues building the separation fence on Palestinian territories. Israel doesn't want peace, nor does it have any peace project. Therefore, we should not deceive our people and tell them that there will be negotiations". 42 Affairs that spoke for the Palestinians and therefore it was less restrained in undermining Abbas than it might have been without a significant electoral victory and the ensuing constitutional powers it enjoyed. The end of a united Palestinian voice in international affairs weakened significantly the Authority because it was now apparent that even if a deal had been struck with Abbas, the Palestinian president would be in no position to implement it. A stalemate in the negotiations obviously followed together with the marginalisation of Hamas in the international sphere.
In these ways, the evidence indicates that the semi-presidential system that the Palestinian Authority adopted made the split between Hamas and Fatah inevitable, rendering effective governance of the Authority impossible and virtually ending the Palestinian democratic experiment. The two sides have been playing the blame game since the break-up, but according to Tamimi "Abbas contrived to establish a parallel government whose policies were diametrically opposed to those of the elected government and whose powers had the effect of rendering the legitimate government powerless." 43 
Conclusion
In January 2006 the Palestinian Authority began a period of cohabitation between a Fatah president and a Hamas prime minister and cabinet. During the next 12 months, the Authority, already weakened by internal economic and social problems and the external security situation, gradually slid into near total ineffectiveness, institutional incoherence and civil war. The semi-presidential structure of the 2003 amended Basic Law was the source of this destabilising period of competition within the executive. We wish to stress that cohabitation did not determine the outbreak of conflict between Hamas and Fatah. Such conflict was the outcome of divergent interpretations of the conflict with Israel and the product of different ideological convictions. Nonetheless, the problems of cohabitation contributed significantly to the timing and scale of the confrontation between the two actors. The creation of two competing centres of power with equal popular legitimacy raised the political stakes within the system as both actors tried to undermine the position of other. In particular, the president's repeated threats to dismiss the prime minister and call fresh elections while refusing to cooperate with the cabinet was extremely destabilising. In the meantime, crucial issues of governance were neglected and there was deadlock in a number of areas such as foreign policy, peace with Israel and domestic security. In this context, the constitutional crisis was 'resolved' by armed conflict, which created two separate jurisdictions that are one in name only. These events demonstrate that political institutions can, and do, have an impact of political outcomes in the Arab world because political actors take them seriously and are responsive to the structures of incentives and constraints created. Specifically, they underline the perils of semi-presidentialism and, in particular, the perils of the president-parliamentary form of semi-presidentialism. To maximise their chances of survival developing democracies should steer clear of this form of semi-presidentialism, and perhaps semi-presidentialism altogether, if they wish to maximise their chances of surviving.
